and Easterbrook (1984) .
Introduction
Understanding dividend behavior has been a major research problem for financial economists for decades. Brealey, Myers & Allen (2006) , in their well known text book, have listed the dividend puzzle among the ten unsolved problems in finance. Indeed the comment from Black (1976) viz. ''The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together'' ( p. 5) is still in many ways an accurate description of the level of our understanding of payout policies.
Recently, Bhattacharyya (2007) proposes an alternative theory for explaining dividends. A testable implication of Bhattacharyya's theory is that we should observe a negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio and executive compensation. Two recent papers Morrill (2008a and 2008b) (BMM)) have tested the Bhattacharyya (2007) model to establish the existence of an empirical link between the dividend payout ratio and executive compensation in the US and Canada. The purpose of this study is to apply the same model to examine whether this linkage between dividend policy and executive compensation is also valid in a European setting such as Germany, a typical European country which is characterized by concentrated ownership and extensive bank relationships with firms. 1 From a policy perspective it is widely recognized that companies around the world operate within a variety of differing institutional environments and corporate governance structures. La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer (1999) , for example compares shareholder relations in 27 countries and 1 Empirical evidence on the link between dividend policy and firm ownership has been well explored for US and UK firms [Rozeff (1982) , Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) , Eckbo and Verma (1994) , and others], however, little attention has been paid to the potential link between institutional ownership and dividend policy in other countries. In fact, Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) in their study of UK firms point out that this constitutes a truly neglected area of research given the fact that the institutional frameworks and ownership structures tend to vary around the world.
concludes that different ownership patterns significantly impact the agency problems of the firm.
The results of this research are important because it will establish whether there is a role for dividends in resolving underlying agency issues under alternative governance structures or not.
There are two important findings of this study.
First, we find that the predictions from the Bhattacharyya (2007) model are robust, in that this theoretical model predicting a negative relationship between executive compensation and dividend payout ratios also appears to hold in Germany. Prior studies have shown that this negative relationship between executive compensations and dividend payout ratios holds for the U.S. and
Canada. This finding is important because it suggests that dividends have an important role in the mitigation of agency costs not only in market based systems as is found in North America, but also in bank based systems such as Germany. Second, we find that bank influence in Germany is positively related to dividend payout ratios. This is consistent with the findings of Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) . Our findings therefore imply that bank influence reduces the impact of hidden information in the sense of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) , by limiting the extent of free cash flow through higher dividend payout. But even in the presence of bank influence, dividends still appear to have a role in mitigating agency issues.
Literature Review and Motivation
Dividends have been a puzzle in the finance literature for a long time, resulting in the advancement of several different theories and paradigms to explain the dividend puzzle. These theories include the: 1) Clientele Theory (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Allen, Bernardo, and Welch, 2000) , 2) Signaling Theory (Bhattacharyya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; Williams, 1988; John and Williams, 1985; Ambarish, John, and Williams, 1987) , 3) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986 ) and 4) Catering Theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004 America is valid for Germany. In addition, our paper controls for bank influence, to determine 1) if the German corporate governance system is able to mitigate any of the agency costs and 2) if dividends still remain relevant as a mechanism to resolve agency issues.
There are several aspects of the German corporate governance structure that are different from the system in the US or Canada. One important difference is the general concentration in ownership structure of the firm, and the second is the broad relationship that banks have with firms in Germany.
German firms typically have a higher ownership concentration compared to North American companies. This stylized fact is supported by Becht and Roell (1999) which finds that "whereas in the U.S.A. over 50% of companies have a largest shareholder who holds less than 5% of the shares, in Austria and Germany there are virtually no such companies" (p.1051). Or, in the words of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) , "Salient features of the corporate governance system in Germany involve pyramiding, cross-shareholdings, and large controlling stakes of families, financial and industrial firms, and the state." (p. 735).
It is widely believed that banks have a degree of control in the German corporate governance system that extends beyond the traditional boundaries of the traditional creditor-lender relationship.
As detailed in Chirinko and Elston (2006) , the primary spheres of influence of banks on firms in
Germany is through 1) bank share ownership and associated voting rights accrued from both direct ownership and collection of proxy votes, 2) through bank representation on the Supervisory Board (SB) which hires and fires management (sometimes as chair or deputy chair) and 3) through bank lending and share underwriting. As shareholders, bank representatives regularly participate at annual shareholders meetings, and are frequently represented on the firm's SB with one or more representatives.
2 This provides a direct line of influence between banks and firms that goes beyond the traditional Anglo-Saxon creditor-firm relationship. Thus, banks can have a significant influence on the decisions of the firm.
The Empirical Model
Following the empirical model outlined in BMM, we start with a regression model which excludes any control variable, and then add important control variables to assess statistical significance of these effects on the firm's dividend payout ratios.
LNRETEN is the Natural log of the retention ratio. Retention ratio is defined as 1-Payout Ratio;
TOTMSAL is the total management salary. CDIVID is the value of dividends paid to the common shareholders and LNINCOME is the Natural log of the net income. These variables are all measured in millions of DM.
When log transformations were used we ensured that only those cases with positive arguments were included. Following BMM our predictions for the model's coefficients are as below:
We also estimated regressions which controlled for the firm' 
DEBTEQUT is the total firm debt to equity ratio. Q is the market to book value of the firm or Tobin's Q. CAPEXP is the capital expenditures of the firm. BOARDNO is the number of members of the management board. AGE is the age of the firm in years in 1986. AK is a ranked measure of the firm's concentration of ownership with 5 being the highest concentration and 1 being the lowest concentration. BANKINF2 is a dummy variable which is set to 1 if there is bank influence on the firm and 0 otherwise. For details of the construction of the bank influence variable see Chirinko and Elston (2006) . We used Tobit in estimating the regression coefficients because the left hand side variable is a censored variable with an upper bound of zero.
Data
This study uses various sources of data which are detailed in Elston and Goldberg (2003 Aktienfuehrer, and various annual reports of the firm. We needed to use several sources of data in order to attempt to comprehensively measures the influence of banks on German corporate governance. We operationalized this information by defining a dummy bank influence variable. A firm is characterized as bank influenced (rather than an independent firm) if a) the bank owns more than 25% of the shares of the firm and no one else owns more than 25%, or b) if total votes of banks at shareholder meetings (including proxy votes) were greater than 50%, or c) if total votes exercised at shareholder meetings were between 25% and 50% and the chair of the Supervisory Board is a banker. The descriptive statistics for the key variables is given in Table 1 . The correlation coefficients between these variables is given is Table 2 <<Table 1 about here>> <<Table 2 about here>>
IV Empirical Results and Discussion

A. Empirical Results
The results are presented in Table 3 .
<<Table 3 about here>>
We can see from the regression results that the testable predictions of the theory developed in Bhattacharyya (2007) are validated for Germany. These results are consistent with those obtained earlier by Morrill (2008a and 2008b) for US and Canada. Specifically we can see that the signs of the coefficients of the Tobit regression are positive and statistically significant for managerial salary or TOTMSAL, and negative and statistically significant for dividend payout or CDVID and firm income or LNINCOME, as predicted by the theory. 5 These results hold even when we control for various other plausible causal effects. In addition, both bank influence or BANKINF2 and concentration of ownership or AK are negative and statistically significant, indicating that both ownership concentration and bank relations impact the firms retention policies.
We have also used industry and year dummy variables but we have not reported those results.
The squared correlation (Pseudo R 2 ) between observed and expected values is about 20% for the regression with control variables. The Wald χ 2 tests the null hypothesis that all of the Tobit model coefficients, other than the intercept term, are zero. The null hypothesis that the model fails to fit the data is strongly rejected at the 99% level.
To examine the robustness of our results we repeated our regressions with average management salary and also with three different constructs for bank influence. Our results were qualitatively similar to the results reported in Table 3 , and thus our findings are at least to some degree robust to specification errors.
B. Discussion of empirical results
We can draw several interesting insights regarding German corporate governance from our results. Corporate governance, inter alia, aims to reduce the informational asymmetry between the shareholders and the managers. In a market based system like that in North America, this agency issue is resolved through the executive compensation contract and by using dividends as an observable contracting variable. In contrast, the German corporate governance model also relies on banks to reduce the informational asymmetry between owners and managers. Our results suggest that the influence of banks in Germany is in fact able to partially resolve this informational asymmetry, and, that dividends appear to play a similar role in resolving the issue of asymmetric information.
Our model has two control variables that have a direct bearing on the agency issue. These are the variables AK and BANKFIN2. AK is a ranked measure of the firms' concentration of ownership with a rank of 5 showing the most concentrated holding and BANKFIN2 is a dummy variable for bank influence both of which are negative and statistically significant. Since our dependant variable is the natural logarithm of the retention ratio, this shows that firms with more concentrated holding and firms influenced by banks are retaining less which means that these firms have higher payout ratios. This finding is also consistent with the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) . We thus conclude that firms with more concentrated holdings and firms which are influenced by banks have better monitoring and are better able to extract cash from the managers in line with the free cash flow hypothesis. However, these alternative governance devices appear to resolve the informational asymmetry only partially. Dividends are also statistically significant, and have a role in resolving the agency issues through a link with the executive compensation. We conclude that the role of dividends in resolving the agency issue is robust across both market based governance systems (as in North America) and bank based governance systems (as in Germany).
Conclusions
Our results show that the negative relationship between executive compensation and dividend payout ratios that exists for North American companies also exists for German firms. This shows that the role of dividends in mitigating agency issues holds even in bank based corporate governance systems such as Germany. In addition, the predictions of the Bhattacharyya (2007) model appear to hold in the German institutional environment. Further these results are robust to specification and highly consistent with earlier studies on US and Canadian firms.
In addition, we found that firms influenced by banks or firms having higher ownership concentrations also have higher dividend payout ratios-a finding that is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis as posited by Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) . Results from this study suggest that bank influenced governance structures may mitigate the agency issues but only partially, and that dividends still play an important role in resolving agency issues -similar to that in market based governance structures.
An important policy implication of this study is that dividends appear to have an important role to play in resolving agency issues even under alternative corporate governance and institutional PAYOUT is the dividend payout ratio. LNRETEN is the Log of (1-PAYOUT). CDIVID is the value of dividends paid to common stock holders. NETINC is the net income for the firm. LNINCOME is the log of NETINC. Q is the market to book value of the firm or Tobin's Q. LTDEBT is the long term debt of the firm. CEQUITY is the value of common stock. DEBTEQUT is the ratio of LTDEBT to CEQUITY. TOTMSAL is the Total amount of compensation spent by the firm on managerial salaries. MSALPER average managerial pay per managing board member of the firm. BOARDNO is equal to TOTMSAL divided by MSALPER.. CAPEXP is the capital expenditures of the firm. All financial variables are measured in millions of DM. AGE is the age of the firm in years in 1986. Units of measurement for monetary variables are millions of DM. PAYOUT is the dividend payout ratio. LNRETEN is the Log of (1-PAYOUT). CDIVID is the value of dividends paid to common stock holders. NETINC is the net income for the firm. LNINCOME is the log of NETINC. Q is the market to book value of the firm or Tobin's Q. LTDEBT is the long term debt of the firm. CEQUITY is the value of common stock . DEBTEQUT is the ratio of LTDEBT to CEQUITY. TOTMSAL is the total amount of compensation spent by the firm on managerial salaries. MSALPER average managerial pay per managing board member of the firm. BOARDNO is equal to TOTMSAL divided by MSALPER.. CAPEXP is the capital expenditures of the firm. AGE is the age of the firm in years as of 1986. Units of measurement for monetary variables are millions of DM. Figures within brackets are t-statistics. ** indicates result significant at 95% level and *** indicates result significant at 99% level of confidence.
